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What empowers the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to seek,
and federal district courts to order, the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains
from securities law violators? The short answer, which stood virtually un-
challenged for nearly forty-six years, is that federal courts may award dis-
gorgement, at the request of the SEC, pursuant to the broad equitable
powers that Congress conferred in the jurisdictional provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws. During the 2017 oral argument in Kokesh v. SEC,
however, five Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court interjected statements ex-
pressing varying degrees of skepticism. The tenor of the questions during
the Kokesh argument, as well as the Court’s unanimous decision concern-
ing disgorgement’s punitiveness and its opaque footnote disclaiming any
view of the judicial power to award the SEC disgorgement, has ignited a
firestorm. Pending litigation includes a class action lawsuit seeking to re-
cover a combined total of at least $14.9 billion in disgorgement payments
that the SEC is alleged to have improperly collected.
That a majority of the Supreme Court might be puzzled over the source
of authority for court-ordered SEC disgorgement is itself puzzling. Two
years prior to Kokesh, in its exercise of original jurisdiction in Kansas v.
Nebraska, the Supreme Court drew upon its own equitable powers to order
disgorgement, in addition to the payment of compensatory damages, as a
remedy for the violation of an interstate water compact that has the status
of federal law. Although the Court split 6-3 as to whether such disgorge-
ment was warranted to deter future “misbehavior,” the Justices were unani-
mous in the view that disgorgement was an equitable remedy. The Kansas
majority also emphasized that a court’s equitable powers are particularly
broad and flexible when the public interest in the enforcement of a federal
law is involved. The five Justices’ skepticism during the Kokesh argument
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is likewise puzzling because while the disgorgement remedy in SEC en-
forcement actions began as interstitial lawmaking pursuant to § 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s broad jurisdictional provision, Congress
has subsequently ratified, and in some instances codified, that disgorge-
ment remedy in six securities statutes enacted between 1984 and 2010.
This essay has two principal goals. One is to elucidate the incontestable
statutory authority for court-ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement ac-
tions. Its other goal is to draw on the Kansas decision to show that such
disgorgement is a statutorily authorized equitable remedy, even in instances
when it constitutes a penalty under the Kokesh criteria.
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AS the many important contributions to this Symposium reveal,there are a host of reasons to commemorate the fiftieth anniver-sary of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
landmark decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS I).1 This essay,
however, uses this anniversary to spotlight TGS II,2 a related decision
issued by a panel of the Second Circuit three years after that circuit’s en
1. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1968) [hereinafter TGS I].
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1309–10 (2d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter
TGS II].
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banc decision affirming the individual defendants’ liability for illegal in-
sider trading. On remand from TGS I, the trial court had ordered those
defendants to disgorge the ill-gotten gains from their purchases of TGS
stock on the basis of material, non-public information.3 The defendants
then appealed the disgorgement orders, claiming that the SEC lacked the
statutory authority to seek such relief. The three-judge panel in TGS II
disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
TGS II, as a matter of first impression, situated the statutory authority
for the disgorgement remedy in the “general equity powers” that Con-
gress conferred upon district courts in the jurisdictional provisions of the
federal securities laws,4 in conjunction with the SEC’s enforcement au-
thority to seek injunctions against securities law violators.5 The panel
deemed the disgorgement orders to be an equitable remedy, rather than a
“penalty assessment” as the appellants had claimed, because the orders
were “ancillary” to the trial court’s injunctive power and “merely de-
prive[d] the appellants of the gains of their wrongful conduct.”6 Utilizing
the court’s equitable authority to award the SEC disgorgement also “pro-
tect[ed] the investing public by providing an effective deterrent to future
violations.”7 Importantly, TGS II invoked the precedent in Porter v.
Warner Holding Co.,8 a decision in which the Supreme Court upheld both
“the power of the Government without specific statutory authority” to
seek illegal gains attained from federal law violations, as well as the au-
thority of lower courts to award that remedy in the exercise of their “gen-
3. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d in relevant
part, TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307–08.
4. See TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307 (citing § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa), which specifies that the “dis-
trict courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this
title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder”) (emphasis added). Congress included similar jurisdictional provisions, en-
compassing “all suits in equity,” in the three other principal federal securities acts, namely:
the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) at § 22(a); the Investment Company Act of
1940 (the Investment Company Act) at § 44; and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the
Investment Advisers Act) at § 214(a). Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 likewise gave
federal courts jurisdiction over ‘‘all suits . . . in equity.’’ 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789); see also U.S.
CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (vesting ‘‘judicial power of the United States’’ in a Supreme Court
and ‘‘such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain,’’ and extending
that power to “all Cases, in Law and Equity”). TGS II, however, focused entirely on the
securities-law jurisdictional provisions. This essay, particularly in view of its space limita-
tions, makes that same choice.
5. See TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307 (citing what is now Exchange Act § 21(d)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 78t(d)(1), which specifies that “[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that
any person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of
any provision of this chapter, [or] the rules or regulation thereunder . . . it may in its
discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States . . . to enjoin such
acts or practices”). In connection with violations of provisions in the three other principal
securities acts, the SEC may pursue injunctive actions pursuant to Securities Act § 20(b),
Investment Company Act § 42(d), and Investment Advisers Act § 209(d).
6. TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307–08.
7. TGS, 312 F. Supp. at 92.
8. 328 U.S. 395, 406 (1946).
898 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
eral equity powers to afford complete relief.”9 TGS II’s holding that
federal courts may award disgorgement to the SEC pursuant to the broad
equitable powers that Congress conferred in the jurisdictional provisions
of the federal securities law was on the mark then and continues to be
authoritative today.
In the forty-six years between TGS II and the Supreme Court’s recent
consideration of Kokesh v. SEC,10 this statutory authority for court-or-
dered disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions stood largely unchal-
lenged.11 Even the petitioner in Kokesh regarded disgorgement as a valid
equitable remedy;12 he was simply challenging the SEC’s long-held view
that disgorgement relief was not a “penalty” within the meaning of the
five-year limitations period applicable to certain enforcement actions ini-
tiated by federal agencies.13 Yet, during the oral argument in Kokesh, five
Justices interjected statements expressing varying degrees of skepticism
about the statutory source for SEC disgorgement: Justice Kennedy ques-
tioned whether there is “specific statutory authority that makes it clear
that the district court can entertain this remedy”;14 Justice Sotomayor
(who subsequently authored the Court’s unanimous opinion) inquired
about the “source of [district courts’] power;15 Justice Alito probed into
“what this thing is”;16 Chief Justice Roberts observed that Congress “did
not specify the remedy”;17 and Justice Gorsuch lamented that “there’s no
statute governing it . . . [w]e’re just making it up.”18
Less than two months after Kokesh’s argument, the Court issued a 9–0
decision that continues to generate intense controversy. The controversy
was prompted not so much by the decision itself, but rather by its dis-
claimer—contained in its third footnote—that it offered “[no] opinion on
whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforce-
ment proceedings.”19 In holding that SEC disgorgement constitutes a
penalty within the meaning of § 2462’s five-year period of limitations, the
Court observed that such “disgorgement is imposed by the courts as a
9. See TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307 (citing Porter, 328 U.S. at 406).
10. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642–45 (2017).
11. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing
cases and observing that disgorgement “is available simply because the relevant provisions
of the [Exchange Act] vest jurisdiction in the federal courts”); SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasizing that when a court orders
disgorgement, it “is exercising the chancellor’s discretion to prevent unjust enrichment”).
12. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1636 (2017) (No.
16-529), 2017 WL 1399509, at *8 (petitioner’s counsel statement that “we’ve never chal-
lenged the capacity of the district court to seek disgorgement; we’ve just said that there’s a
time limitation”).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (specifying that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of
Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five
years from the date when the claim first accrued”).
14. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 7–8.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id. at 52.
19. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643 n.3.
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consequence for violating . . . public laws” and that the disgorgement is
intended principally to deter such violations rather than to compensate
those harms by misconduct.20 It further maintained that orders imposed
in order to deter infractions “are inherently punitive because ‘deterrence
is not a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective.’”21 Moreover,
disgorged funds, at the discretion of district courts, are sometimes distrib-
uted as compensation to identifiable victims (as they were in TGS II)22
but at other times are paid to the U.S. Treasury (as they were in
Kokesh).23 In the Court’s view, such disbursements to the U.S. Treasury
held particular significance because “[w]hen an individual is made to pay
a noncompensatory sanction to the Government as a consequence of a
legal violation, the payment operates as a penalty.”24
The skepticism conveyed during the Kokesh argument, set against the
backdrops of the Court’s now famous “footnote three” and its declara-
tions concerning disgorgement’s punitiveness, has prompted substantial
speculation about the remedy’s validity. What began as a wave of com-
mentary from securities law practitioners25 and scholars,26 was soon fol-
lowed by (thus far) unsuccessful litigants opposing SEC disgorgement.27
Other litigants have contended that Kokesh calls into question disgorge-
20. Id. at 1643.
21. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
22. See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 174–76 (2d Cir. 1997) (observing that it
is the SEC’s “policy wherever possible . . . to recommend a distribution plan by which a
defendant’s unlawful gains are paid out to defrauded investors,” but recognizing that
“[o]nce the profits have been disgorged, it remains within the court’s discretion to deter-
mine how and to whom the money will be distributed”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
23. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Robert Annello, Chronicle of Disgorgement’s Death Foretold: Kokesh v.
SEC, FORBES (Jul. 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/07/11/chronicle-of-
disgorgements-death-foretold-kokesh-v-sec/ (describing the Kokesh footnote as a “ticking
time bomb”); Andrew J. Morris, “Kokesh v. SEC”: Its Wide-Ranging (and Mostly Good)
Implications for Disgorgement Actions, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (June 14, 2017), https://
wlflegalpulse.com/2017/06/14/kokesh-v-sec-its-wide-ranging-and-mostly-good-implications-
for-disgorgement-actions/ [https://perma.cc/45SG-BCSY] (predicting “it is very possible
the SEC could lose its judge-made ability to seek disgorgement”). In advance of this post-
Kokesh wave, there were a few ripples raising questions about disgorgement’s equitable
label. See infra notes 144, 148 (citing Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Fac¸ade of SEC Disgorge-
ment, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (November 15, 2013), http://www.hblr.org/2013/11/
the-equity-facade-of-sec-disgorgement/ [https://perma.cc/CFW2-AXAA]; Francesco A.
DeLuca, Sheathing Restitution’s Dagger under the Securities Acts: Why Federal Courts Are
Powerless to Order Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 33 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 899 (2014)).
26. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future
of the Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases, 56 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 17, 29 (2018) (sug-
gesting that, in light of Kokesh, the future of SEC disgorgement “looks bleak”); Samuel
Bray, Equity at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/10/equity-at-the-su
preme-court/ [https://perma.cc/H569-TX3F] (“In Kokesh, footnote three is a warning from
the Supreme Court about the disgorgement remedy sought by the SEC”).
27. See, e.g., SEC v. Jammin Java Corp., No. 15-cv-08921 SVW (MRWx), 2017 WL
4286180, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “Kokesh should
be construed so as to eliminate the disgorgement remedy altogether”).
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ment sought in enforcement actions initiated by other federal agencies,28
or that Kokesh’s penalty analysis applies to injunctions and other types of
remedial relief sought by the SEC.29 The post-Kokesh lawsuits appear to
be picking up steam: the SEC was recently named as a defendant in a
class action complaint filed by the national law firm that authored the
amicus brief submitted by Mark Cuban in the Kokesh litigation.30 The
lawsuit seeks to recover at least $14.9 billion in disgorgement payments
that the SEC is alleged to have improperly collected.31
Whether in the context of commentary or litigation, these recent chal-
lenges to the disgorgement remedy proceed along two intersecting tracks.
One set of challenges correctly observes that Congress has granted the
SEC express legal remedies on multiple occasions since TGS II,32 but
then goes on to argue either (1) that these express legal remedies (partic-
ularly civil monetary penalties) eliminate the need for the equitable rem-
edy of court-ordered disgorgement,33 or (2) that the authority to exercise
general equitable power pursuant to the jurisdictional provisions in the
federal securities laws has since been supplanted by an express and pur-
portedly more restrictive statutory provision in the Exchange Act author-
izing “equitable relief . . . for the benefit of investors.”34 The other set of
28. See, e.g., FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, No. 17 C 194, 2018 WL 482076, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2018) (stating that “[t]he Court sees nothing in the ‘principles’ of
Kokesh” undermining controlling precedents in the Seventh Circuit, which specifically au-
thorizes disgorgement and restitution in FTC suits (citation omitted)).
29. See, e.g., SEC v. Collyard, 861 F.3d 760, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that an
“injunction’s ‘equitable’ label does not exempt it from being a § 2462 ‘penalty’” but con-
cluding that the district court’s injunction did not operate as a penalty in this instance
because it was “imposed to protect the public prospectively, not redress public wrong”
(citation omitted)); Saad v. SEC, 873 F.3d 297, 304–05 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (joining in remand order so that the SEC can address Kokesh’s relevance to
permanent bars from the securities industry, and asserting that “[l]ike disgorgement paid
to the Government, expulsion or suspension of a securities broker does not provide any-
thing to the victims to make them whole or remedy their losses”).
30. See generally Class Action Complaint, Jalbert v. SEC, No. 1:17-cv-12103, 2017 WL
4876155 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2017) (identifying Brown Rudnick LLP as counsel of record);
Brief for Mark Cuban as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct.
1635 (2017) (No. 160529), 2017 WL 929704 (filed March 3, 2017) (identifying Brown Rud-
nick LLP as counsel of record).
31. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 30, ¶ 1.
32. See Part I infra.
33. See Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 26–27 (arguing that civil monetary penalties in
SEC enforcement actions “are the functional equivalent of disgorgement” and questioning
“whether courts should continue to impose a sanction unauthorized by statute when an
equivalent sanction has been so authorized”); Class Action Complaint, supra note 30, ¶ 21
(contending that the SEC has continued to argue “for implied remedies, while also using
its statutorily authorized enforcement tools” and that “[a]s a result, the SEC sought and
obtained double recovery exceeding statutory limits and without statutory authority”).
34. Infra note 108 (quoting § 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act). See Brief for Mark Cu-
ban as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitoner, supra note 30, at *7 (narrowly construing
§ 21(d)(5) to contain binding “statutory limitations” that effectively prohibit the SEC from
obtaining disgorgement “for the purpose of being paid over to the treasury”); Class Action
Complaint at ¶ 23, supra note 30 (interpreting § 21(d)(5) to mean that disgorged funds
“must be returned to the victim” and may not be disbursed to the U.S. Treasury); infra text
accompanying note 111 (quoting a statement by Justice Sotomayor during the Kokesh ar-
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challenges is rooted in the claim that “there are no penalties in equity.”35
That is, these challengers are arguing that disgorgement’s post-Kokesh
status as a “penalty” removes the remedy from the realm of equity, and
renders it instead a remedy that can neither be sought by the SEC nor
ordered by a district court in the absence of explicit congressional
authorization.36
This essay has two principal goals. One is to elucidate the incontestable
statutory authority for court-ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement
actions. Although the disgorgement remedy in TGS II began as intersti-
tial lawmaking pursuant to the jurisdictional provisions in the federal se-
curities laws,37 Congress ratified, and in some instances codified, that
disgorgement remedy in six subsequent federal securities statutes—start-
ing in the 1980s with legislation directed at high profile insider trading
scandals and continuing through the congressional response to the 2008
Financial Crisis.38 Part I examines this legislation and highlights the statu-
tory text that currently references “disgorgement” in judicial actions
brought by the SEC. It also examines the Congressional Committee Re-
ports that accompanied the six statutes. Part I’s analysis demonstrates
that Congress never intended its express grants of authority for civil mon-
etary penalties to supplant a court’s general equitable power to order the
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains from a securities law violator. In fact, the
congressional drafters of the civil penalty provisions specifically contem-
plated that courts would award such penalties in addition to disgorge-
ment. They also recognized that it was sometimes not feasible for courts
to distribute disgorged funds as compensation to victims of wrongful acts.
Part I’s analysis further shows that, far from seeking to curtail the SEC
and federal courts’ traditional use of the disgorgement remedy, § 21(d)(5)
of the Exchange Act’s express authorization for “equitable relief . . . for
the benefit of investors” represents a congressional effort, in the wake of
the corporate governance and accounting scandals at Enron and
WorldCom, to go beyond the disgorgement remedy to reach a broader
range of unjust enrichment on the part of corporate executives.39
gument that could be construed to suggest that § 21(d)(5) is the sole basis for SEC dis-
gorgement and that the provision required investor restitution).
35. Bray, supra note 26.
36. See id. (contending that “[d]isgorgement to the SEC can be a penalty or it can be
equitable; the Supreme Court just said it’s a penalty; it can’t be equitable. And if it’s not
equitable—jurors, report for duty”); Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 30 (citing Bray and con-
tending that “[i]f disgorgement is a penalty, . . . courts lack the power and the SEC lacks
the authority” to grant/seek it as a type of equitable relief). But see Daniel B. Listwa &
Charles Seidell, Penalties in Equity: Agency Use of Disgorgement After SEC v. Kokesh, 35
YALE J. ON REG. 667, 671 (2018) (concluding that notwithstanding “its alluring simplicity,”
the no penalties in equity argument is “unpersuasive”).
37. Cf. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (observ-
ing that “the inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial
federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts”).
38. See Part I infra (discussing federal securities statutes enacted in 1984, 1988, 1990,
1995, 2002, and 2010).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 113–117 (examining Exchange Act § 21(d)(5)’s
legislative history and observing that the provision was designed to reach benefits attained
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Part II turns to this essay’s second goal, which is to reconcile the status
of disgorgement as a statutorily authorized equitable remedy with
Kokesh’s holding that disgorgement is punitive, and thus, a penalty for
purposes of the five-year limitations period applicable to certain govern-
ment enforcement actions. Its analysis calls attention to Kansas v. Ne-
braska,40 a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision that has been overlooked
in the post-Kokesh disgorgement critiques. The Kansas decision captures
an unprecedented instance in which the Supreme Court itself, in the exer-
cise of its original jurisdiction, awarded disgorgement to remedy the vio-
lation of an interstate water compact with the status of federal law.41 As
Justice Kagan and the five other Justices who joined in her opinion saw it,
Nebraska’s violation of the water compact resulted from its “misbehav-
ior,” and therefore the Court could use its broad equitable powers to or-
der Nebraska to disgorge some of its unlawful gains, in addition to
Nebraska’s payment of compensatory damages for Kansas’s loss.42 Dis-
gorgement, the Court explained, “appropriately reminds Nebraska of its
legal obligations, deters future violations, and promotes the Compact’s
successful administration.”43 Thus, in the very words the Kokesh Court
articulated two years later, Kansas’s disgorgement order “bears all the
hallmarks of a penalty: It [was] imposed as a consequence of violating a
public law and [was] intended to deter, not to compensate.”44 Notably,
the Kansas Court rooted its disgorgement decision in the 1946 precedent
in Porter—the identical precedent that the Second Circuit invoked in
TGS II—to emphasize that “[w]hen federal law is at issue and ‘the public
interest is involved,’ a federal court’s ‘equitable powers assume an even
broader and more flexible character than when only a private controversy
is at stake.’”45
Because even the Justices who refused to join in the disgorgement or-
der agreed that it was an equitable remedy,46 the Kansas decision leaves
no doubt of the Supreme Court’s view that court-ordered disgorgement
need not be compensatory and can be both equitable and punitive.
by corporate executives during periods in which their companies had violated federal se-
curities law, notwithstanding that their benefits (whether from salary, bonuses, or their
own personal stock transactions) did not directly result from securities law violations they
themselves committed).
40. 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1051–64 (2015).
41. See id. at 1053 (observing that the interstate compact “counts” as federal law be-
cause it received Congress’s “blessing”).
42. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1055–56. Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kennedy
joined fully in Justice Kagan’s majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts joined with the ma-
jority in ordering disgorgement pursuant to the Court’s “equitable power,” but dissented
from the part of the opinion that granted reformation of the interstate compact. See id. at
1064 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Kansas, 135 S. Ct at 1057.
44. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
45. Kansas, 135 S. Ct at 1053 (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398).
46. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1070 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Alito, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (“Disgorgement is strong medicine, and as with
other forms of equitable power, we should impose it against the States only ‘sparingly’”)
(quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995)).
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Whether equitable authority is conferred on the Supreme Court by Arti-
cle III of the U.S. Constitution or to federal district courts by Congress in
the general jurisdictional provisions of the federal securities laws, the pu-
nitiveness of disgorgement does not operate to sever the remedy from its
equitable realm.
I. CONGRESS AND THE DISGORGEMENT REMEDY IN SEC
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Since the decision in TGS II, Congress has enacted six securities stat-
utes encompassing provisions that ratify, and in some instances codify,
court-ordered disgorgement as a remedy in SEC enforcement actions.
These six statutes include: the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
(ITSA);47 the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 (ITSFEA);48 the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies Act);49 the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA);50 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002;51 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).52 As we shall see, in each instance
the statutory text as well as its legislative history rest on the congressional
understanding that the general jurisdictional provisions of the federal se-
curities laws authorize federal district courts to order disgorgement as a
type of equitable relief.
A. THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984
In the early 1980s, Congress sought to intensify the existing criminal
and civil sanctions for insider trading and tipping in order to deter viola-
tions. It did so in ITSA by raising the maximum criminal fine for Ex-
change Act violations from $10,000 to $100,000, and by authorizing the
SEC to seek court-ordered civil monetary penalties, up to three times the
profit made or loss avoided, for defendants found liable for illegal tipping
or trading.53
Although ITSA did not expressly reference the term “disgorgement,”
the statutory text did make clear that the new authorization for civil mon-
etary penalties was intended to supplement and enhance the SEC and
federal courts’ then-existing enforcement authority. Specifically, what
was then codified as § 21(d)(2) of the Exchange Act provided that:
47. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
48. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 120 Stat. 4677 (1988).
49. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
50. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
51. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
53. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 §§ 3, 5.
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Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has vio-
lated any provision [or rule of the Exchange Act] . . . by purchasing
or selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation . . . the Commission may bring an action in a United States
district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose,
a civil penalty . . . . The amount of such penalty shall be determined
by the court in light of the facts and circumstances, but shall not ex-
ceed three times the profit gained or losses avoided as a result of the
unlawful purchase or sale, and shall be payable to the Treasury of the
United States. The actions authorized by this paragraph may be
brought in addition to any other actions that the Commission or the
Attorney General are entitled to bring.54
There is no doubt that the above reference to “any other actions . . .
that the Commission [is] entitled to bring” encompassed both injunctive
relief and court-ordered disgorgement. Indeed, the Report of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, which is the only written report
accompanying ITSA, is replete with references to both remedies.55 The
Report also evidences Congress’s view that the statutory source for dis-
gorgement lies in the jurisdictional provisions of the federal securities
laws. As the House Report explains,
Once the equity jurisdiction of a court has been invoked on a show-
ing of a securities violation, the court possesses the necessary power
to fashion an appropriate remedy. Thus, the Commission may request
that the court order certain equitable relief, such as the disgorgement
(giving up) of illegal profits.56
Although the Committee was clear that equitable relief should con-
tinue to be used “aggressively and creatively to meet market abuses,” it
regarded disgorgement, together with an injunction against future viola-
tions, as an “insufficient deterrent.”57 That is, disgorgement and injunc-
tions were viewed as wanting because the “risk of incurring such penalties
often fails to outweigh the temptation to convert nonpublic information
into enormous profits.”58 The civil monetary penalty authorized under
ITSA stood as a more powerful deterrent because monetary sanctions did
more than “merely restore[ ] a defendant to his original position”—a
sanction of up to three times the illicit gain or loss avoided would “ex-
tract[ ] a real penalty for his illegal behavior.”59
The House Report is likewise clear that ITSA’s provision for civil mon-
etary penalties should not supplant court-ordered disgorgement of an in-
sider trading defendant’s illicit profits. The Committee emphasized at the
54. Id. § 2(A) (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 7 (1983) (“The principal, and often effectively
only, remedy available to the Commission against insider trading is an injunction against
further violations of the securities laws and disgorgement of illicit profits.”); infra text ac-
companying notes 56–61.
56. H.R. REP. NO. 98-335, at 7 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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outset that the new and existing remedies for insider trading violations
were cumulative. It also recognized that, when appropriate, disgorgement
may be distributed to the investors who were damaged by the insider
trading. But Congress hardly required such distribution:
The new penalty may be used in addition to existing remedies availa-
ble to the Commission. Thus, in appropriate insider trading cases, the
Commission may seek: (1) a court order enjoining the violator from
breaking the law again; (2) disgorgement of ill-gotten gains which
may, if appropriate, be paid into an escrow fund so that traders or
other private parties damaged by the insider trading can obtain com-
pensation for their losses; and (3) the imposition of the new civil
money penalty payable to the U.S. Treasury.60
The Report then reiterated the Committee’s view that civil monetary
penalties could be sought and ordered in addition to disgorgement:
The Act creates an additional remedy for insider trading in secon-
dary trading markets by providing that whenever it appears that cer-
tain transactions were illegal because they were effected by someone
in possession of material nonpublic information, the Commission, in
addition to seeking other remedies such as an injunction or disgorge-
ment, may seek an order in a district court action requiring the viola-
tor, or anyone who aided and abetted the violation, to pay as a civil
penalty an amount of money up to three times the profit gained or
loss avoided as a result of the unlawful transaction.61
There is one additional aspect of ITSA that warrants emphasis: the
House Report evidences a congressional understanding that equitable
remedies, specifically injunctions and disgorgement, constituted punitive
sanctions, at least of a sort. As the italicized statements above reveal, the
Committee used the term “penalties” to describe injunctions and dis-
gorgement,62 whereas it used the phrase “real penalty” to describe the
three-times-profit sanction.63 These statements reflect the common sense
notion that the term “penalty” lends itself to gradations, from mild to
severe. The statements also demonstrate that even in 1983, just over a
decade after TGS II’s distinction between “remedial” relief and “a pen-
alty assessment,” Congress saw no contradiction in categorizing disgorge-
ment as both equitable and punitive.
B. THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 1988
ITSFEA constitutes the second occasion on which Congress ratified
court-ordered disgorgement as an available remedy against a securities
law violator. But whereas ITSA’s text only implicitly recognized the dis-
60. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
62. See supra text accompanying note 58.
63. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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gorgement remedy, ITSFEA included a provision that explicitly codified
court-ordered disgorgement.
ITSFEA sought to further augment the enforcement of the federal se-
curities laws, particularly in the area of insider trading.64 The legislation
amended the Exchange Act in multiple ways, including by: (1) raising the
maximum criminal penalties under § 32(a) to a fine of $1 million, ten
years in prison, or both;65 (2) modifying ITSA’s penalty provision to clar-
ify liability for “tipping” and to encompass “controlling persons;”66 and
(3) establishing an express private right of action for investors who traded
contemporaneously with a person found to have violated an Exchange
Act provision or rule by “purchasing or selling any security while in pos-
session of material, non-public information,”67 or for unlawfully commu-
nicating such information to a person who uses it to trade.68
Section 20A of the Exchange Act’s express right of action for contem-
poraneous traders is the ITSFEA provision that codifies that federal
courts in the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction may order disgorge-
ment in SEC actions seeking injunctive relief. Section 20A(b)(2)
provides:
Offsetting Disgorgements Against Liability.—The total amount of
damages imposed against any person [found liable for illegal tipping
or trading] shall be diminished by the amounts, if any, that such per-
son may be required to disgorge, pursuant to a court order obtained at
the instance of the Commission, in a proceeding brought [for an in-
junction] under § 21(d) of [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] re-
lating to the same transaction or transactions.69
The italicized reference to court-ordered disgorgement evidences a Con-
gress completely cognizant and supportive of what had become the SEC’s
practice of seeking unjust enrichment recovery, as ancillary relief to an
injunction, in the lion’s share of insider trading actions initiated since
TGS II. Section 20A(b)(2) further reflects a congressional determination
that defendants who were previously ordered by a court to disgorge their
gains in an SEC enforcement should not bear additional liability for dam-
ages incurred by contemporaneous traders.
ITSFEA also amended ITSA’s civil monetary penalty provision by ex-
tending it to “controlling persons” who recklessly disregard the likelihood
that an employee or agent is engaging in illegal tipping or trading;70 and
by clarifying that tippers may be subject to civil penalties for any tipping
activity that involves a violation of the law, irrespective of the tippee’s
64. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 1.
65. Id. § 4. These maximum criminal penalties were again increased in 2002, such that
§ 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012), currently pro-
vides for fines of not more than $5 million and/or imprisonment of not more than twenty
years.
66. Securities Exchange Act § 21A.
67. Id. § 20A(a).
68. Id. § 20A(c).
69. Id. § 20A(b)(2) (emphasis added).
70. Id. § 21A(a)(1)(B).
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liability.71 But that civil penalty provision, re-codified as § 21A of the Ex-
change Act, retained the proviso from four years earlier that its civil mon-
etary penalties were “not exclusive.”72 That is, § 21A(d)(3) expressly
provides that actions for a penalty of up to three times the gain made or
loss avoided “may be brought in addition to any other actions that the
Commission or the Attorney General are entitled to bring.”73 The Report
from the House Committee on Energy and Commerce once again left no
doubt that such civil penalties were intended “to go beyond disgorgement
of illegal profits to add the imposition of a significant fine as a needed
deterrent.”74
ITSFEA’s text, in conjunction with the House Report, also demon-
strates that Congress definitely contemplated disgorgement orders that
would, in certain circumstances, make non-trading tippers, in Justice
Sotomayor’s recent words in Kokesh, “worse off” by requiring such tip-
pers to disgorge the trading profits gained by persons with whom they
had communicated the material, non-public information, even though
such tippers never actually received or shared in the profits.75 After quot-
ing the statutory text that ensures that persons who control tippers would
not be liable “for the profits of the possibly endless chain of persons who
may trade on the information before it is public,”76 the House Report
observed that the Committee chose not to apply that same limiting lan-
guage to SEC enforcement actions brought directly against tippers them-
selves. As the Committee explained, the “public interest nature of
Commission actions necessitates that the Commission’s ability to obtain
the full scope of equitable and other relief available in appropriate cases
remain unimpaired.”77 The Committee then provided the following ex-
ample: “if a tipper’s communication resulted in profits to his direct tippee
and to remote tippees as well, the Commission could obtain disgorgement
from the tipper of the profits of both the direct and remote tippees, and
could seek an ITSA penalty of up to three times that amount.”78 Thus, in
the Committee’s view, the equitable discretion Congress had accorded to
district courts supported orders directed at recouping all illicit profits that
resulted from a person’s unlawful tipping activity, whether or not the ini-
tial tipper actually shared in the proceeds derived from the tip and re-
gardless of whether that tipper had been the one to communicate the
material nonpublic information to any remote tippees.
71. Id. § 21A(a)(1)(A).
72. Id. § 21A(d)(3).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. H.R. Rep. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988) (emphasis added).
75. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017) (concluding that SEC disgorge-
ment was punitive, in part because such disgorgement does not always “simply return[ ] the
defendant to the place he would have occupied had he not broken the law”).
76. H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 20 (quoting § 21A(a)(3), which in an SEC enforcement
action against the controlling person of a tipper, limits the penalty computation to “the
profit gained or loss avoided . . . by the person or persons to whom the controlled person
directed such communication”) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 20 n.16.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
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C. THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES AND PENNY STOCK
REFORM ACT OF 1990
As the legislation’s title suggests, Congress enacted the Remedies Act
to provide the SEC with a broader range of enforcement remedies to
protect investors and promote the integrity of the national securities mar-
kets. The legislation complemented the insider trading penalty scheme in
ITSA and ITSFEA by amending the Exchange Act and the three other
principal securities acts to authorize the SEC to seek civil monetary pen-
alties in federal district courts for other types of securities law viola-
tions.79 The Remedies Act also broadened considerably the remedies
available to the SEC in its own administrative proceedings by authorizing
the imposition of “cease-and-desist” orders against securities law viola-
tors80 and by authorizing the entry of orders for “an accounting and dis-
gorgement.”81 The legislation’s panoply of other new remedies, while
undoubtedly important to the SEC’s overall enforcement program, have
much less relevance to the focus of this essay.82
The Remedies Act has both statutory text and legislative history that
confirm Congress’s intent to build upon the remedy of court-ordered dis-
gorgement in enforcement actions involving securities law violations
other than insider trading. With respect to the statutory text, each of the
Act’s four civil monetary penalty provisions states that the civil penalty
remedy is “not exclusive.”83 Moreover, both the House and Senate Com-
mittee Reports accompanying the Remedies Act make numerous direct
references to the SEC’s new ability to seek civil monetary penalties in
addition to disgorgement.84 For example, at the outset of the House Re-
port, the Committee on Energy and Commerce observed that the Reme-
dies Act authorizes “the federal courts to order the payment of civil
money penalties, in addition to disgorgement, for a broad range of viola-
79. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(3) (2012); Secur-
ities Act of 1933 § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. 77t(d) (2012); Investment Company Act of 1940
§ 42(e), 15 U.S.C. 80a-41(e) (2012); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(e), 15 U.S.C.
80b-9(e) (2012). Each of these penalty provisions specify a three-tiered structure for virtu-
ally any violation of any provision in each act, apart from insider trading offenses, which
remain subject to the penalty provisions in ITSA/ITSFEA.
80. Exchange Act § 21C(a); Securities Act § 8A(a); Investment Company Act
§ 9(f)(1); Investment Advisers Act § 203(k).
81. Exchange Act §§ 21B(e), 21C(e); Securities Act § 8A(e); Investment Company
Act §§ 9(e), 9(f)(5); Investment Advisers Act §§ 203(j), 203(k)(5).
82. See generally Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Hardball! The SEC’s New Arsenal of En-
forcement Weapons, 47 BUS. LAW. 33 (1991) (examining the Remedies Act’s grants of au-
thority for court-ordered asset freezes, court-ordered officer and director bars, cease-and-
desist orders in administrative proceedings, and civil monetary penalties in certain adminis-
trative proceedings brought against securities professionals, including broker-dealers, in-
vestment advisers, and their associated personnel).
83. See Exchange Act § 21(d)(3)(c)(iii); Securities Act § 20(d)(3)(C); Investment
Company Act § 42(e)(3), Investment Advisers Act § 209(e)(3)(C).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13, 22, 31 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 3–4, 8–12, 16
(1990).
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tions of the federal securities laws.”85 The Senate Banking Committee’s
Report was likewise explicit in recognizing that “[c]ourts in civil proceed-
ings currently may order disgorgement under their equitable powers,”86
and that the new civil monetary “penalties may be imposed in addition to
orders of disgorgement directing a defendant to return the full amount of
profits derived from a violation, and other forms of equitable relief.”87
The Senate Report also recognized that courts may use “their equitable
powers to require that law violators ‘disgorge’ the amounts by which they
are unjustly enriched,” even in instances when it is the general public,
rather than specifically identifiable investors, who were harmed by the
violations.88 Moreover, both Reports deemed it important enough to reit-
erate the cumulative and flexible nature of the remedies: “[C]ourts will
have the flexibility to order injunctive or other equitable relief only, in-
junctive or other equitable relief and a penalty, or a penalty only, depend-
ing upon the facts of a particular case.”89
The Remedies Act provisions that empowered the SEC to enter orders
requiring “an accounting and disgorgement, including reasonable inter-
est” also authorized the SEC to “adopt rules, regulations, and orders con-
cerning payments to investors, rates of interest, periods of accrual, and
such other matters as it deems appropriate to implement [the remedy].”90
But Congress hardly anticipated that all disgorged funds in administrative
proceedings would be distributed to investors. Indeed, the House Report
explicitly recognized that “[d]isgorgement is different from restitution or
damages in that, whereas the latter are designed to compensate the vic-
tims of a violation, disgorgement ‘is a method of forcing a defendant to
give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.’”91 The House
85. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (emphasis added); id. at 17 (stating that while de-
fendants could “reap enormous profits” from securities law violations other than insider
trading, such violators were subject only to “an order of disgorgement,” which “merely
requires the return of wrongfully obtained profits; it does not result in any actual economic
penalty or act as a financial disincentive to engaging in securities fraud”). The House Re-
port further observed that its codification of “ancillary relief” in the form of court-ordered
officer and director bars should not be read to “restrict the court’s inherent equitable au-
thority” and noted that this “could include orders directing disgorgement of unlawful prof-
its.” Id. at 31.
86. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 8 n.7.
87. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 16 (emphasis added). See id. at 10 (“[The new] authority to
seek or impose substantial money penalties, in addition to the disgorgement of profits, is
necessary for the deterrence of securities law violations”); id. at 13 (observing that “if a
violation involves fraud and resulted in substantial losses to other persons, a court (in addi-
tion to ordering disgorgement of profits) may assess a civil penalty equal to a violator’s
gain, even when that gain exceeds the applicable [monetary] limitation[s]”).
88. Id. at 9 (observing that the SEC may obtain disgorgement “when there are viola-
tions of disclosure and filing requirements under the Federal securities law” and citing SEC
v. First City Financial Corp., 890 F. 2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
89. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 17 (emphasis added); H. REP. NO. 101-616, supra note 84,
at 22 (emphasis added).
90. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 § 8A(e).
See supra note 81 (citing “accounting and disgorgement” provisions in the four principal
securities acts).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 35 (quoting SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir.
1985) (a decision that emphasized that district courts possess “the equitable power to grant
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Report also stated that “[t]he Commission, of course, will continue to be
able to seek disgorgement in its civil injunctive actions.”92 The Senate
Report is likewise clear that this new administrative authority to order
disgorgement was intended to codify a remedy that was already available
to the SEC in federal district court and was often obtained through agree-
ments from respondents “as part of settlement of administrative
proceedings.”93
Digging further into the legislative history of the Remedies Act reveals
an important fact that has thus far escaped notice in any of the recent
challenges to SEC disgorgement: the Senate Committee had actually con-
templated parallel statutory authorizations for court-ordered disgorge-
ment. But the Committee ultimately decided that such explicit
authorization was unnecessary, based on the advice of the SEC. That fact
can be inferred from a written colloquy between Senate Banking Com-
mittee Chairman Donald Riegle and Richard Breeden, who was then the
Chairman of the SEC:
[Question #1] Disgorgement
The penalty provisions of the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies
Act are intended to be independent of disgorgement of any profits
obtained by the securities law violator as a result of the wrongful
conduct. Please suggest clarifying language for S. 647 to ensure that
both disgorgement and the penalties provided in the bill can be ob-
tained from securities law violators.94
Notwithstanding Senator Riegle’s request, the SEC’s response did not in-
clude such “clarifying language.” As Chairman Breeden explained,
The Commission did not include such language in the legislation as
submitted, because it did not believe that the language was neces-
sary. The provision in S. 647 for penalties in civil actions was based
upon [the penalty provisions in ITSFEA and ITSA]. Both § 21A and
S. 647 provide that the civil penalty actions that they authorize may
be brought in addition to any other action that the Commission or
the Attorney General is entitled to bring. The legislation that the
Commission submitted to Congress on February 9, 1990 contains
similar language. This language makes clear that a penalty action is
not an exclusive remedy, and that an action for disgorgement also
would be available in appropriate cases.95
disgorgement without inquiring whether, or to what extent, identifiable private parties”
have been harmed) and SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102
(2d Cir. 1978) (a decision which underscored that “the primary purpose of disgorgement is
not to compensate investors. . . . [I]t is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the
amount by which he was unjustly enriched”).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 35 (emphasis added).
93. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 16.
94. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. and
Urban Affairs on S. 647, 101st Cong. 426 (1990) (written responses of Richard Breedan,
Chaiman, SEC).
95. Id.
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Chairman Breeden’s response further assured Congress that while
neither ITSFEA nor ITSA’s text “expressly referred to disgorgement, the
courts have routinely ordered disgorgement and penalties in the same
case.”96 That Congress would have so heavily weighted the SEC’s input
on issues related to the Remedies Act is not at all surprising—the legisla-
tion originated from drafts of legislation that were proposed initially and
later revised and resubmitted by the SEC.97
Had the SEC a crystal ball in 1990 that could have revealed either the
questions that would be posed by the five Justices during the Kokesh ar-
gument98 or the recent challenges to the SEC disgorgement remedy (in-
cluding the pending class action seeking recovery of $14.9 billion in
previously obtained SEC disgorgement),99 Chairman Breeden surely
would have provided Senator Riegel with statutory text suggestions to
authorize explicitly the remedy of court-ordered SEC disgorgement as
well as to clarify that courts can order civil monetary penalties in addition
to such disgorgement. At the time, however, it was reasonable for the
SEC to have assumed that the “remedy not exclusive” text in the legisla-
tion—coupled with the expressed intentions of Congress and the nearly
two decades of judicial practice since TGS II—provided sufficient cer-
tainty in each respect. It was also reasonable for Congress to treat as a
given that courts would adhere to the repeatedly expressed congressional
intentions as well as the firmly ensconced lower court precedents.
D. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
The PSLRA imposes numerous restrictions on securities actions filed
by private plaintiffs, who, as Congress saw it, were acting at the direction
of securities lawyers all too often seeking simply to reach a quick settle-
ment and collect their attorney fees. Consistent with this supposition, the
PSLRA contains a provision thwarting attempts by the securities-plain-
tiffs’ bar to lay claim to portions of disgorged funds that had been
awarded to the SEC by federal courts. Specifically, the PSLRA amended
both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to include a provision that
specified:
Prohibition of Attorneys’ Fees Paid From Commission Disgorgement
Funds.— Except as otherwise ordered by the court upon motion by
the Commission, or, in the case of an administrative action, as other-
wise ordered by the Commission, funds disgorged as the result of an
action brought by the Commission in Federal court, or as a result of
any Commission administrative action, shall not be distributed as
payment for attorneys’ fees or expenses incurred by private parties
96. Id. (citing cases and ITSA House Report).
97. See S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 4 (detailing the history of the legislation and observing
that S. 647 “originally was submitted to Congress by the SEC on September 28, 1988 and
was developed, in part, in response to certain recommendations of the National Commis-
sion on Fraudulent Financial Reporting”).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18.
99. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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seeking distribution of the disgorged funds.100
The text of these provisions not only codify Congress’s conviction that
court-ordered disgorgement is an appropriate remedy for established vio-
lations of the federal securities laws. It also evidences congressional re-
spect for judicial determinations that are grounded in equity. That is,
although Congress as a general matter decided that funds disgorged by
defendants in SEC enforcement actions should not be used to offset ex-
penses incurred by private parties seeking a share of the proceeds, Con-
gress nonetheless granted federal courts the authority to trump that
decision in actions where justice warranted a departure from the default
principle.
E. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
Enacted in the wake of the corporate governance and accounting scan-
dals at Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other public companies, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was described at the time as “the most far reaching
reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.”101 Only two provisions in the Act’s eleven titles (running
sixty-six pages) directly bear on the remedy of court-ordered SEC dis-
gorgement. One such provision authorizes the SEC to create, for the
benefit of injured parties, so-called “fair funds” obtained from disgorge-
ment and civil monetary penalty orders. The other provision authorizes
the SEC to seek, and federal courts to grant, “any equitable relief . . . for
the benefit of investors.”102
The text of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s “Fair Funds” provision reveals
yet another instance of court-ordered disgorgement’s congressional codi-
fication and provides even more evidence that the civil monetary penalty
sanction was never intended to supplant a federal district court’s general
equitable authority to order the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains from a
securities law violator. Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act pro-
vided that:
Civil Penalties Added to Disgorgement Funds for the Relief of Vic-
tims.—If in any judicial or administrative action brought by the
Commission under the securities laws . . . the Commission obtains an
order requiring disgorgement against any person for a violation of
such laws or the rules or regulations thereunder, or such person
agrees in settlement of any such action to such disgorgement, and the
100. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(f); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(4)
(emphasis added).
101. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2002, at A1.
102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(b)(5) (codified at Securities Exchange Act §21(d)(5)).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also amended the federal bankruptcy laws to provide that certain
debts would be non-dischargeable if they were incurred in violation of the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. See id. at § 803(3)(iii) (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(19) and extending to any court or administrative order for any “penalty, citation,
restitutionary payment, [or] disgorgement payment”).
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Commission also obtains pursuant to such laws a civil penalty against
such person, the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or
at the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of
the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the victims of such
violation.103
Prior to this “Fair Funds” provision, while monies disgorged by a securi-
ties law violator were typically distributed to identifiable injured parties
(subject to a court’s equitable discretion and the SEC’s ability to identify
such parties),104 monies attained through the imposition of civil monetary
penalties were required to be dispersed only to the U.S. Treasury.105 Ac-
cordingly, § 308, which was codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246, substantially in-
creased the amount of funds that could be distributed to the defrauded
shareholders of publicly traded companies or other victims of securities-
law wrongdoing.106 However, as the italicized text makes clear, a dis-
gorgement order was an explicit, necessary condition for a civil monetary
penalty to be included in any fair fund distribution. Were court-ordered
disgorgement anything another other than a congressionally authorized
remedy, this fair-funds provision would have been logjammed because,
while the SEC at the time had the authority to order disgorgement in its
own administrative proceedings, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, its
authority to order civil monetary penalties in such proceedings extended
only to regulated entities and their associated persons.107
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s other SEC disgorgement-related provision is
codified at § 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act, which states in full:
Equitable Relief.—In any action or proceeding brought or instituted
by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the
Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equita-
ble relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of
103. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a) (emphasis added) (codified, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7246). See generally Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for De-
frauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317 (2008); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s
Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103 (2008).
104. See supra note 22 (quoting SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir.
1997)).
105. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 21A(d)(1) (directing to the U.S. Treasury any
civil monetary penalties imposed in insider trading cases); Securities Exchange Act
§ 21(d)(3)(C)(i) (directing to the U.S. Treasury court-ordered civil monetary penalties for
Exchange Act violations other than insider trading).
106. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308 further mandated that the SEC study and report on its
prior five years of “proceedings to obtain civil penalties or disgorgements to identify areas
where such proceedings may be utilized to . . . provide restitution for injured investors . . .
and to improve the collection rates for civil penalties and disgorgements.” Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 308(a).
107. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the
SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 352 (2015) (observing that prior to
the Dodd-Frank Act, “the SEC’s authority to impose civil fines in an administrative pro-
ceeding was limited to actions against broker dealers, investment advisors, and clearing
agencies . . . [and to] force other securities violators, in particular issuers and their officers
and directors, to pay civil fines, the SEC had to sue in federal court”). See also infra text
accompanying notes 121–124 (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendment to the “Fair
Fund” provision).
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investors.108
This plain text is frustratingly ambiguous, supporting both narrow and
broad constructions.
As the recent challengers to the SEC disgorgement remedy have urged,
§ 21(d)(5) can be construed in an exceptionally narrow manner to “statu-
torily displace[ ]” the equitable power that Congress conferred to district
courts in the jurisdictional provisions of the federal securities law.109 The
plain text can likewise be read to put an “investor-benefit condition on
grants of ‘equitable relief.’”110 In fact, during the Kokesh argument, even
Justice Sotomayor seemed to suggest that § 21(d)(5) is the sole basis for
SEC disgorgement and that the provision requires investor restitution.111
But it would be exceedingly odd, to say the least, for a monumental
legislative effort directed at preventing future accounting scandals to
override sub silencio decades of prior practice by eliminating the SEC’s
ability to recover ill-gotten gains in judicial actions that could compensate
victims other than investors (such as securities issuers or market partici-
pants) or when ill-gotten gains must be disbursed to the U.S. Treasury
because restitution is not possible or feasible. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
legislative purpose runs diametrically counter to such narrow construc-
tions of § 21(d)(5).
The SEC, not surprisingly, construes § 21(d)(5) more broadly to con-
firm the agency’s authority to seek, and the equitable authority of courts
to order pursuant to their jurisdictional provisions, the remedy of dis-
gorgement in its enforcement actions. Some securities law scholars like-
wise view § 21(d)(5) as an effort by Congress to “remov[e] any lingering
doubt about the availability of disgorgement in judicial proceedings.”112
The plain text of § 21(d)(5) also supports these broader readings because
any recoupment of a securities law violator’s unjust enrichment could be
108. Securities Exchange Act § 21(d)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5)). Congress
included this “equitable relief” provision in § 305 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which it enti-
tled “Officer and Director Bars and Penalties.” Only two subsections follow: an (a) subsec-
tion, which amends the Exchange Act and the Securities Act to authorize officer and
director bar orders when the SEC can establish “unfitness” as opposed to “substantial
unfitness,” and the (b) subsection, which authorizes “equitable relief.” Congress’s depic-
tion of the latter (and perhaps the former) as “penalties” is consistent with the ITSA
House Report’s observation that injunctions and disgorgement are “penalties,” albeit not
the “real penalty” of a civil monetary penalty. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 63;
infra text accompanying note 171.
109. Brief for Americans for Forfeiture Reform as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529), 2017 WL 929701, at *13; see
also supra notes 30–34 (quoting allegations in a class action complaint against the SEC and
arguments made by commentators) (citation omitted).
110. See Brief for Americans for Forfeiture Reform Supporting Petitioner as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 109, at *13.
111. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 12, at 9 (quoting the text of
§ 21(d)(5), depicting the provision as “the only authority [for disgorgement] that [she] can
imagine,” and asking rhetorically “if they’re not doing restitution, how could that be the
basis of disgorgement?”).
112. Black, supra note 103, at 325–26.
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said to ensue to “the benefit of [all] investors,” even in instances where
restitution to particular investors is impossible or impracticable.
Section 21(d)(5)’s legislative history, although sparse, resolves its tex-
tual ambiguity and substantiates its intended breadth. But the provision
not only confirms the traditional remedy of court-ordered SEC disgorge-
ment. It also provides entirely new authorization for the SEC and courts
to go beyond the traditional disgorgement remedy to reach other in-
stances of unjust enrichment involving the performance-based salary or
bonuses, or the personal securities transactions, of corporate executives.
That § 21(d)(5) constitutes a congressional effort to expand the tradi-
tional remedy of court-ordered disgorgement is evidenced by the provi-
sion’s sole reference in the Senate Banking Committee Report:
The Commission has also suggested that it should be allowed to ob-
tain additional relief in enforcement cases. For a securities law viola-
tion, currently an individual may be ordered to disgorge funds that
he or she received ‘‘as a result of the violation.’’ Rather than limiting
disgorgement to these gains, the bill will permit courts to impose any
equitable relief necessary or appropriate to protect, and mitigate
harm to, investors.113
This paragraph immediately follows the Senate Report’s discussion of “a
number of changes to improve the responsibility of public companies for
their financial disclosures.”114
The Senate Report’s above italicized reference to the SEC’s suggestion
for “additional relief” almost certainly alluded to corporate-governance
proposals made in both chambers of Congress by then-SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt and former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden. As Chairman
Pitt explained to the House Financial Services Committee:
[T]here is a need to make sure that management’s incentives align
with shareholders’ interests. Just last week, we brought a case that is
a bit unusual for the Commission in which we have sought to have a
former CEO of a public company disgorge his compensation in stock
options and bonuses because the appearance of profitability was an
illusion. I believe that the Commission has to be much more aggres-
sive in targeting misconduct. And where serious misconduct has oc-
curred, I think one incentive or sanction has to be removing any
benefits and making certain that benefits are seen as a long-term
proposition and not as a short-term.115
113. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27 (2002) (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 23.
115. See H.R. 3763—The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and
Transparency Act of 2002: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 77
(2002) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 3763] (testimony of SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt).
The case to which Chairman Pitt was referring was undoubtedly SEC v. John P. Gallo,
Exchange Act Release No. 1521, 2002 WL 390033 (Mar. 13, 2002). See BNA, SEC Sues
Former IGI President, Seeks Return of Stock Options, Bonuses, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 455
(Mar. 18, 2002) (citing statement from an SEC attorney that “the case stands out because
one of the remedies it sought is a return of gains from stock option awards and bonuses
based on alleged false financial results”).
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Former Chairman Breeden likewise championed an expansion of the
traditional disgorgement remedy to encompass other types of unjust en-
richment by corporate executives whose actions (or inactions) contrib-
uted to shareholder losses, notwithstanding that those actions did not
constitute federal securities law violations. Responding to a question
about whether there should be a “down side” that would require a “CEO
[to pay] out of his own pocket,” Breeden stated:
I think your point of there being a down side is important. I think the
President’s messages have emphasized that. Chairman Pitt’s remarks
have emphasized that. My own testimony suggests that we do need
to do more in the disgorgement area. I am particularly worried about
the situation where an executive may be selling, in Gary Winnick’s
case in Global Crossing, $750 million worth of stock on the eve of
bankruptcy and whether or not you should trigger it by a restate-
ment. I think Congress should consider whether stock sales within a
certain period of time of the company going into bankruptcy,
whether the profits from those sales by senior officers shouldn’t be
recaptured into the bankruptcy estate.116
Chairman Breeden’s reference to “the President’s messages” was no
doubt directed at President George W. Bush’s 10 Point-Plan to “improve
corporate responsibility and help protect America’s shareholders,” which
included the observation that “CEOs or other officers should not be al-
lowed to profit from erroneous financial statements” as well as a proposal
that their “bonuses and other incentive-based forms of compensation
would be disgorged in cases of accounting restatements resulting from
misconduct.”117
With respect to such monetary “clawbacks” for CEOs and CFOs spe-
cifically, President Bush’s plan came to fruition in § 304(a) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires CEOs and CFOs to reimburse secur-
ities issuers for any bonus or incentive-based or equity-based compensa-
tion they received, or for any profits they realized from sales of the
issuer’s securities, in specified circumstances in which the issuer has had
to restate its financial statements.118 Section 304(a)’s clawback provision,
however, does not extend to unjust enrichment by other senior officers,
as had been suggested by former Chairman Breeden, nor does it encom-
pass unjust enrichment from other securities-law violations by issuers,
116. Hearings on H.R. 3763, supra note 115, at 145 (testimony by former SEC Chair-
man Richard Breeden). Chairman Breeden may well have had in mind Professor Deborah
DeMott’s observation that when the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship “seeks dis-
gorgement of the fiduciary’s illicit gains, the absence of but-for causation does not necessa-
rily exonerate the fiduciary.” See Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm,
91 B.U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2011).
117. See The President’s 10-Point Plan, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 6, 2002, 10:18 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1015460971646141720. See also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 23 (stating
that some of the statutory provisions were drawn from “reform proposals by the President
on March 7, 2002”).
118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243).
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apart from accounting transgressions, that result in substantial share-
holder losses.
Section 21(d)(5)’s grant of judicial authority for “any equitable relief
. . . for the benefit of investors” therefore provides a broader and more
flexible path toward recovery against a wider range of corporate execu-
tives, who may have profited unjustly (assuming the SEC could make that
showing) during times when their companies were engaged in securities
law violations. But in 2002, unlike today in the wake of Kokesh, there was
never uncertainty as to whether the SEC could seek, and federal courts
could order, the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains that resulted directly
from a defendant’s own violation of the federal securities laws.
F. THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND INVESTOR
PROTECTION ACT OF 2010
The Dodd-Frank Act is a massive piece of legislation that affects virtu-
ally every aspect of the financial industry. It encompasses sixteen titles
with multiple subtitles and spans nearly 850 pages.119 Only two of its pro-
visions relate specifically to SEC disgorgement. The first such provision
amended the Exchange Act to require the SEC to pay a qualified
whistleblower a bounty award when the SEC has been provided with
“original information” about a securities law violation that leads to an
enforcement action resulting in “monetary sanctions” of more than $1
million (a figure that includes both civil monetary penalties and “dis-
gorgement . . . ordered to be paid” in any judicial or administrative ac-
tion).120 By including in the statute an explicit reference to disgorgement
paid in judicial actions, Congress once again codified its decades-old un-
derstanding that the SEC may seek and federal courts may order securi-
ties law violators to disgorge their ill-gotten gains.
The Dodd-Frank Act’s other SEC disgorgement-related provision
amended the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s “Fair Funds” provision to eliminate a
defendant’s disgorgement of ill-gotten gains as an express condition pre-
cedent for the creation of a fair fund. As such, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) cur-
rently provides:
Civil Penalties to be Used for the Relief of Victims.— If, in any judi-
cial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the
securities laws, the Commission obtains a civil penalty against any
person for a violation of such laws, or such person agrees, in settle-
ment of any such action, to such civil penalty, the amount of such
civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of the Commis-
sion, be added to and become part of a disgorgement fund or other
fund established for the benefit of the victims of such violation.121
119. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
120. Id. § 922 (codified at Securities Act of 1934 § 21F(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(4)).
121. Id. § 929B (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)) (emphasis added).
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Congress amended the provision at the behest of SEC officials who, years
before, had urged it to rectify what they had categorized as the “technical
limitation in the wording” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.122 In instances in
which a defendant did not reap any profits from his or her securities law
violation, and thus could not be ordered to pay disgorgement, the techni-
cality impeded the creation of any compensatory fund into which the pay-
ment of civil monetary penalties could be placed.123 In the wake of the
Financial Crisis of 2008, Congress finally acceded to the SEC’s request
and altered § 7246(a) to ensure that civil penalties could be directed into
a “disgorgement fund” in those instances in which a defendant’s ill-gotten
gains were recouped and into an “other fund” in instances in which dis-
gorgement was not awarded.124 The amended provision demonstrates,
once again, that Congress was fully cognizant of the distinction between
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and civil monetary penalties, and that
Congress sought to ensure that both types of sanctions could be distrib-
uted for the benefit of injured investors and other “victims.”
The Dodd-Frank Act also contains two provisions that explicitly au-
thorize disgorgement as a type of court-ordered “equitable” remedy that
may be sought by two other federal agencies—the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)125 and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), a new federal agency that was created under the Act.126
As the text makes clear, these provisions also authorize each agency to
seek, and federal courts to award, “restitution.” These separate authori-
zations for disgorgement and restitution mirror the same congressional
understandings reflected in the Remedies Act’s legislative history –
namely, that “[d]isgorgement is different from restitution” and that court-
ordered disgorgement need not be compensatory to be categorized as
122. See It’s Only Fair: Returning Money To Defrauded Investors, Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
108th Cong. 7 (2003) (testimony by Stephen M. Cutler, Director, SEC Division of
Enforcement).
123. See id.
124. Notably, prior to § 7246(a)’s amendment, the SEC and courts would on occasion
create single-dollar disgorgement funds into which substantial civil monetary penalties
could be added. Cf. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-670, SEC AND CFTC PEN-
ALTIES: CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN COLLECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER SEC MAN-
AGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED 28 (2005) (discussing a court-approved settlement in
connection with a $1.1 billion accounting fraud under which the securities issuer agreed to
pay $25 million in civil monetary penalties and only $1 in disgorgement).
125. Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 744, 124 Stat. 1376, 1735 (2010) (amending § 6c(d) of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d), to provide: “(3) Equitable Remedies.—In any action brought
under this section, the Commission may seek, and the court may impose, on a proper
showing, on any person found in the action to have committed any violation, equitable
remedies including—(A) restitution to persons who have sustained losses proximately
caused by such violation (in the amount of such losses); and (B) disgorgement of gains
received in connection with such violation.”).
126. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1055(a) (specify-
ing that in enforcement actions brought by the newly created Federal Consumer Protection
Bureau, the federal district court “shall have jurisdiction to grant any appropriate legal or
equitable relief with respect to a violation of Federal consumer financial law” including
“restitution” and “disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment”).
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equitable.127
G. SUMMARY
As the forgoing analysis of the six securities statutes reveals, Justice
Gorsuch’s lament that “there’s no statute governing it . . . [w]e’re just
making it up,” like the other instances of skepticism expressed by the
Justices in the Kokesh argument,128 fails to recognize the numerous post-
TGS II references to court-ordered disgorgement in the statutory text.
Specifically, in one section of the Securities Act and three sections of the
Exchange Act, as well as in a “Fair Funds” provision of the U.S Code, the
statutory text explicitly references disgorgement in judicial actions
brought by the SEC. And in contrast to the legislative reenactment doc-
trine, which merely infers ratification from Congress’s failure to disturb
well-settled judicial or administrative interpretations of the law,129 these
textual references constitute a codification of the court-ordered disgorge-
ment remedy itself.
The skepticism expressed in the Kokesh argument also fails to take ac-
count of the illuminating legislative history from the Committee Reports,
which as Justices Sotomayor and Breyer have recently emphasized, are a
“particularly reliable source to which [the Court] can look to ensure [its]
fidelity to Congress’ intended meaning.”130 That legislative history
reveals three crucial insights: (1) Congress views court-ordered disgorge-
ment as an appropriate use of the equitable powers it conferred to federal
district courts in the jurisdictional provisions of the federal securities laws
and, more recently, in § 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act; (2) Congress ex-
pects courts to assess the facts and circumstances surrounding securities
law violations and to order both disgorgement and civil monetary penal-
ties when the public interest warrants it; and (3) Congress recognizes that
courts have discretion over the disbursement of disgorged funds and an-
ticipates that judges will often be unable to identify particular third-party
victims to whom such funds can be distributed as compensation.
In short, the statutory text and legislative history lead to an inescapable
conclusion: Any judicial action to cast aside the disgorgement remedy
would displace decades of congressional lawmaking with a single, and ex-
traordinarily improper, judicial veto.
127. See supra text accompanying note 91 (quoting the Remedies Act House Report).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18 (quoting Kokesh Oral Argument Tran-
script).
129. See, e.g., Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985) (stating that “Congress is
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to
adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change”).
130. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor, J. and
Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (Rehnquist,
J.) (“In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source
for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which
represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in
drafting and studying proposed legislation” (internal quotes omitted)).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S VIEW OF EQUITABLE POWERS
THAT ARE USED TO FURTHER THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL LAW
Part II of this essay shifts the focus from Congress to the Supreme
Court. But here again we shall see a clear understanding that disgorge-
ment is an equitable remedy even in instances when it operates as a pen-
alty. Moreover, like Congress, the Supreme Court has broadly construed
the scope of equitable jurisdiction, particularly in instances when a court’s
equitable power is invoked to further the public interest in the enforce-
ment of federal law. Section A of Part II examines Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.,131 a 1946 decision recognizing that general grants of equita-
ble jurisdiction empower courts in government enforcement actions to
order restitution, an equitable remedy with many similarities to disgorge-
ment. It then analyzes Kansas v. Nebraska,132 a 2015 decision in which
the Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, invoked Porter to
justify the use of its own equitable powers to order disgorgement as a
remedy for the violation of an interstate water compact with the status of
federal law. Section B explains why the disgorgement in Kansas operated
as a “penalty” under the Kokesh criteria. The Kansas decision leaves no
doubt of the Supreme Court’s view that court-ordered disgorgement need
not be compensatory and can be both equitable and punitive.
A. COURT-ORDERED DISGORGEMENT AS AN EQUITABLE REMEDY
The Supreme Court in Kansas v. Nebraska, like the Second Circuit in
TGS II, justified its decision to use its own equitable powers to award
disgorgement by invoking the precedent in Porter v. Warner Holding
Co.133 The Porter case involved an injunctive action brought by the Ad-
ministrator of the Office of Price Administration against a landlord who
had charged excessive rents in violation of the Emergency Price Control
131. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
132. 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015).
133. Porter, 328 U.S. at 396–403. In addition to Porter, TGS II invoked two other prece-
dents that relied heavily on Porter. See TGS II, 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing
Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 335 (1960) (upholding the district
court’s equitable authority to order restitution of lost wages to employees discharged in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, in the context of an injunctive action initiated by
the Secretary of Labor) and United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1960) (upholding the
district court’s equitable authority to order restitution of “overceiling rentals collected,”
notwithstanding that a “prohibitory injunction [was] not required because the defense-
rental area was decontrolled after the violations” of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947)).
To be sure, TGS II also used the Supreme Court’s implied private right of action cases to
bolster its holding. See Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 27 (observing that TGS II relied on
“the logic of the early Supreme Court decisions creating implied private rights of action
under the securities laws” and contending that these decisions “no longer have the vitality
they possessed when [TGS II] was decided”). But it was the Court’s actual holding in
Porter, rather than the logic of its implied private action decisions, that supplied the prece-
dent that equitable powers could be utilized flexibly to further the public interest by deter-
ring future violations of a federal law.
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Act of 1942. The district court enjoined the landlord from continuing to
collect such rents. But it determined, and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit agreed, that it lacked the statutory authority to order resti-
tution of the illegal rents to the tenants. The Supreme Court concluded
otherwise, holding that the absence of a specific statutory authorization
did not constrain the broad equitable powers of a district court to
“secur[e] complete justice . . . [through] a decree compelling one to dis-
gorge profits . . . acquired in violation” of the statute.134 As the Court saw
it, the restitution of the excessive rent charges would further “the public
interest by restoring the status quo” and “would give effect to the policy
of Congress.”135 It also emphasized that when a federal law has been vio-
lated and “the public interest is involved,” a court’s “equitable powers
assume an even broader and more flexible character than when only a
private controversy is at stake.”136 The Court therefore remanded the
case so that the district court could properly “exercise the discretion that
belongs to it.”137
Instead of the Porter decision, most of the commentators and litigants
who reject an equitable label for court-ordered SEC disgorgement look
to the Supreme Court’s 5–4 decisions in Great-West Life & Annuity In-
surance Co. v. Knudson138 and Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.139 But both of these decisions involved private
disputes, not government enforcement proceedings. Thus, even in the ab-
sence of the Court’s more recent decision in Kansas, the precedents in
Great-West Life and Grupo Mexicano are only tangentially relevant to
the issue of court-ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions.
The Court in Great-West Life narrowly construed the term “equitable
relief” in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to in-
clude only those remedies “‘that were typically available in equity.’”140
That is, as it had held six years prior in Grupo Mexicano, the Court deter-
mined that the statutory term “equitable relief” encompassed only those
equitable remedies in existence when the Constitution and the Judiciary
Act of 1789 adopted what was then “administered by the English Court
of Chancery.”141 Because the Great-West Life petitioners’ claim was not
that the plan beneficiary held “particular funds” belonging to them, but
rather that they were simply “contractually entitled to some funds,”142
Justice Antonin Scalia and the others in the majority concluded that the
134. Id. at 398–99. In so holding, the Court observed that “[r]estitution . . . lies within
[its] equitable jurisdiction” and that such restitution “is consistent with and differs greatly
from the [statutory] damages and penalties which may be awarded.” Id. at 402.
135. Id. at 400, 403.
136. Id. at 398.
137. Id. at 403.
138. 534 U.S. 204, 233–34 (2002).
139. 527 U.S. 308, 342 (1999).
140. Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,
256 (1993) (emphasis in original)).
141. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 318.
142. Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 214 (emphasis in original).
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relief the petitioners sought constituted a “legal” remedy rather than an
“equitable” one.143
Most SEC disgorgement detractors construe Great-West Life and
Grupo Mexicano in a manner that either substantially curtails, or elimi-
nates entirely, the power of federal courts to order the disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains from securities law violators. Some of those advocating
the former argue that “[i]n order to qualify as true equitable relief . . .
disgorgement must seek recovery of specifically traced funds of the vic-
tim.”144 They also assert that equitable disgorgement is necessarily com-
pensatory and that it cannot encompass a court’s order for ill-gotten gains
to be disgorged to the U.S. Treasury.145 And even though the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s legislative history makes no reference to the ruling in Great-
West Life, and instead evidences a congressional intention for courts to
make broader use of their disgorgement powers,146 some disgorgement
detractors nonetheless argue that the opinion “sheds key light on Con-
gress’s decision to use the words ‘equitable relief’ in [§ 21(d)(5) of the
Exchange Act] seven months later.”147 Commentators construing Great-
West and Grupo Mexicano to disavow all or almost all instances of court-
ordered disgorgement in SEC actions premise their argument on the
claim that the disgorgement remedy has no analog in 1789 English High
Court of Chancery decisions, and thus conclude that “federal courts may
not award the SEC’s disgorgement remedy pursuant to their equity juris-
dictions.”148 Similarly, in the context of his commentary on the Kokesh
decision, a notable remedies scholar made the sweeping claim that
“[t]here is no equitable remedy of disgorgement.”149
But in Kansas v. Nebraska, when the Supreme Court considered
whether its own inherent equitable powers could support a special
master’s recommendation to order the disgorgement of wrongfully at-
143. Id. at 213–15 (emphasizing that equitable relief is available only for the return of
“money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff [that] could
clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendants’ possession.”). Justice
Ginsburg sharply objected to the majority’s analysis in both decisions. See id. at 224–34
(Ginsburg, J. joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, J.J., dissenting); Grupo Mexicano, 527
U.S. at 335–42 (same).
144. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 30, ¶ 23; Brief for Mark Cuban as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 30, at 15 (“Once one views the SEC’s
claim for disgorgement through the analytical prism of Great-West, it is clear that the SEC
is actually seeking civil penalties under the guise of disgorgement”); Ryan, supra note 25,
at 20 (maintaining that “disgorgement is often not an equitable remedy in SEC enforce-
ment cases but rather a legal remedy akin to a simple money judgment”).
145. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 30, ¶ 2 (alleging that “when the SEC ob-
tained ‘disgorgement’ and handed the proceeds over to the U.S. Treasury, it did so without
proper authority”).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 113–117.
147. Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans for Forfeiture Reform Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 109, at 10.
148. DeLuca, supra note 25, at 900. See Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 28–29 (citing
DeLuca and casting doubt on the judicial analysis “analogizing disgorgement to remedies
that did exist in 1789”).
149. Bray, supra note 26. See also id. (observing that the word disgorgement “does not
even appear in Pomeroy’s [1941] treatise on equity”).
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tained profits (in addition to the payment of compensatory damages) to
remedy a state’s knowing violation of an interstate water compact with
the status of federal law, not one of the nine Justices mentioned the “eq-
uitable relief” precedents in Grupo Mexicano or Great-West Life.150 Nor
did any of the Justices inquire as to whether chancery courts typically
ordered the disgorgement remedy in 1789—let alone claim that true equi-
table relief may only seek the return of particularly identified assets to
their rightful owners. Instead, the majority quoted Porter to emphasize
that the Court’s equitable powers to enforce the compact are “‘broader
and more flexible’” than in litigation involving “‘only a private contro-
versy.’”151 The Court also quoted Porter to underscore that its equitable
powers allow it to “‘mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
case,’ and ‘accord full justice’ to all parties.”152 None of the three dissent-
ers disputed the majority’s categorization of disgorgement as an “equita-
ble remedy.”153 But because they viewed the litigation as “in essence, a
contract dispute,” they sharply objected to the majority’s determination
to analogize the compact to “a federal regulatory program.”154
The Court’s decision to order disgorgement in Kansas v. Nebraska
holds especial significance for the future of court-ordered disgorgement
in SEC enforcement actions. To whatever extent Great-West Life and
Grupo Mexicano may have narrowed the scope of equitable relief in
other contexts,155 the Court’s more recent view of equitable powers when
the enforcement of federal law is at issue undercuts entirely the blanket
claim that “[t]here is no equitable remedy of disgorgement.”156
B. COURT-ORDERED DISGORGEMENT AS A PUNITIVE REMEDY
The Kansas v. Nebraska decision goes to the heart of the current SEC
disgorgement controversy for a second reason: the decision demonstrates
that the remedy of disgorgement need not be compensatory and can be
both equitable and punitive. In other words, Kansas establishes that there
can indeed be “penalties in equity.”
The facts in Kansas involved an interstate water compact setting out
Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado’s rights to the waters of the Republican
150. As the Court made clear at the outset of its analysis, proceedings under the Consti-
tution’s grant of original jurisdiction to hear suits between the states are “‘basically equita-
ble in nature.’” Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1051 (2015) (quoting Ohio v.
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 648 (1973)).
151. Id. at 1053 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (cita-
tion omitted)).
152. Id. (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398).
153. Id. at 1070 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that “[d]isgorgement is strong medicine, and as with other forms
of equitable power, we should impose it against the States ‘only sparingly’”) (quoting Mis-
souri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995)).
154. Id. at 1066.
155. See generally Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 997 (2015).
156. See supra note 26 (quoting Bray).
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River Basin.157 All nine Justices agreed with the special master’s finding
that Nebraska had “‘knowingly failed’ to comply with the compact,”158
and six Justices agreed with the special master’s determination that such
knowing overconsumption constituted “misbehavior” that warranted re-
lief beyond Nebraska’s payment of the $3.7 million in damages for the
water that Kansas lost.159 The special master had recommended an addi-
tional $1.8 million payment, which he described as only “partial disgorge-
ment” because “Nebraska’s reward for breaching the Compact was ‘much
larger than Kansas’ loss, likely by more than several multiples.’”160 The
majority accepted this recommendation, stating that it “may order dis-
gorgement of gains, if needed to stabilize a compact and deter future
breaches, when a State has demonstrated reckless disregard of another,
more vulnerable State’s rights under that instrument.”161 In so doing, it
emphasized that disgorgement “constitutes a ‘fair and equitable’ remedy
for Nebraska’s breach,” because it “appropriately reminds Nebraska of
its legal obligations, deters future violations, and promotes the Compact’s
successful administration.”162 It also it quoted Porter for the proposition
that “‘[f]uture compliance may be more definitely assured if one is com-
pelled to restore one’s illegal gains.’”163
Although Justice Kagan’s opinion did not explicitly categorize its dis-
gorgement order as a penalty, under the analysis in Kokesh v. SEC, there
should be little doubt that the Court’s award of equitable relief was in
fact “punitive.” The Kokesh Court grounded its framework in two long-
standing principles, both of which are satisfied by the findings in the Kan-
sas case. First, according to Kokesh, “whether a sanction represents a
penalty turns in part on ‘whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a
wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.’”164 The Kansas Court,
as we have seen, underscored that the compact had the status of federal
law, that it was seeking “to give complete effect to public law,” and that
“‘the public interest is involved.’”165 Second, according to Kokesh, pecu-
niary sanctions may operate as penalties when they are “sought ‘for the
purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like man-
ner’—as opposed to compensating a victim for his loss.”166 Kokesh fur-
ther observed that “[s]anctions imposed for the purpose of deterring
157. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1048–49.
158. See id. at 1051 (quoting Report of the Special Master at 112, Kansas v. Nebraska,
135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) (No. 126)); id. at 1064-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
159. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1055–56.
160. Id. at 1049, 1056 (quoting Report of the Special Master at 178). In this regard, the
Court observed that “the higher value of water on Nebraska’s farmland than on Kansas’s
means that Nebraska can take water that under the Compact should go to Kansas, pay
Kansas actual damages, and still come out ahead.” Id. at 1057.
161. Id. at 1057.
162. Id. (citing Porter, 328 U.S. at 400).
163. Id. (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 400).
164. 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892)).
165. See supra text accompanying note 45 (quoting Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1053).
166. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668).
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infractions of public laws are inherently punitive because ‘deterrence [is]
not [a] legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectiv[e].’”167 But Kansas
did not order disgorgement for a compensatory reason—Nebraska had
already agreed to pay restitution for the damage it caused Kansas. In-
stead, in the Court’s view, some additional relief in the form of disgorge-
ment was warranted because it “would deter future breaches” and
remind Nebraska of its legal obligations.168 Thus, as Kokesh found with
respect to SEC disgorgement, the equitable disgorgement that was or-
dered in Kansas “bears all the hallmarks of a penalty: It [was] imposed as
a consequence of violating a public law and [was] intended to deter, not
to compensate.”169
One final observation should be made at this juncture. At least at first
blush, the categorization of a disgorgement order as both an equitable
remedy and a penalty could appear in tension with United States v. Tull, a
decision in which the Court observed that “a court in equity . . . may not
enforce civil penalities.”170 But a closer examination of Tull reveals that
there is no such tension.  While SEC disgorgement and the disgorgement
in Kansas constitute a “penalty” under Kokesh’s analysis, in neither in-
stance can the disgorgement be said to constitute a “real penalty” in the
words of the House Report on ITSA,171 or a “penalty assessment” to
quote the Second Circuit in TGS II,172 or a “civil penalty” akin to a “civil
fine” as was at issue in Tull itself.173 A district court’s equitable powers
do not encompass those sanctions because they go beyond “restoring the
status quo”174 or “merely depriv[ing]” those who violate the law “of the
gains of their wrongful conduct.”175 Another important distinction be-
tween “real” penalties and disgorgement is that civil monetary penalties
are in amounts, or up to thresholds, determined by Congress, whereas
disgorgement can “be calculated solely on the basis of [the] equitable de-
terminations [of] the profits gained from violations of the statute.”176
167. Id. at 1643 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 161–62 (quoting Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1057).
169. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644. The principal difference between the disgorgements in
Kansas and Kokesh is that the funds disgorged in Kokesh were paid over to the U.S. Trea-
sury, whereas the funds disgorged in Kansas were paid to Kansas. But it was the district
court in Kokesh that determined how the funds were to be disbursed and, presumably, it
had determined that disbursement to the defrauded victims was not feasible. See supra
note 22.
170. 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
171. See supra text accompanying note 59.
172. See supra text accompanying note 6.
173. Tull, 481 U.S. at 425–27 (holding that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the
right to a jury trial to determine liability in an Environmental Protection Agency enforce-
ment action seeking a civil monetary penalty “not to exceed $10,000 per day” during the
period of the defendant’s violation of the Clean Water Act). Although the Tull Court did
not explicitly acknowledge that penalties may vary in their level of punitiveness, its use of
the term “penalty” when referencing the well-established equitable remedy of restitution is
quite telling. See id. at 424 (depicting “restitution [as] a more limited form of penalty than a
civil fine”).
174. Id. (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 402).
175. See supra text accompanying note 6 (quoting TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307–08).
176. Tull, 481 U.S. at 422.
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Thus, while disgorgement may constitute a “penalty” under Kokesh’s ex-
pansive analysis, the disgorgement ordered in both Kansas and Kokesh
was entirely distinct from the civil monetary penalties that Congress au-
thorizes federal agencies to seek, and district courts to grant, pursuant to
express statutory provisions such as those in ITSFEA, the Remedies Act,
and the Clean Water Act (the statute at issue in Tull). It is that type of
monetary sanction, as the Tull Court held, that was “traditionally availa-
ble only in a court of law.”177
Ultimately, then, the Supreme Court’s view of equitable powers that
are used to further the public interest in the enforcement of federal law
squarely aligns with Congress’s view, as reflected in the text and legisla-
tive history of the six securities statutes discussed in Part I of this essay.
Thus, at least in the context of SEC enforcement actions brought in fed-
eral court, the punitive aspects of disgorgement do not operate to sever
the remedy from its equitable realm.
III. CONCLUSION
Although TGS II is still three years away from its own golden anniver-
sary, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kokesh has rendered TGS II
as iconic as TGS I. TGS II articulated what has since become a funda-
mental precept that has been ratified, and in several instances codified, by
Congress in six securities statutes: that federal district courts may use
their statutorily authorized equitable powers to award the SEC disgorge-
ment of ill-gotten gains from securities law violators, notwithstanding that
the disgorgement may constitute a penalty.
177. Id. See Listwa & Seidell, supra note 36, at 679 (analyzing Tull and concluding that
the decision “provides strong reasons to reject not only the conflation of ‘penalty’ and ‘civil
penalty,’ but also the broader contention that disgorgement is not an equitable remedy”).
